Transportation is responsible for implementing new safety improvements and regulations with the goal of ensuring limited funds are distributed to where they can have the greatest impact on safety. In this work, we conduct a study of new regulations and other reactions (such as recalls) to fatal accidents in several different modes of transportation implemented from 2002 to 2009. We find that in the safest modes of commercial aviation and bus transport, the amount of spending on new regulations is high in relation to the number of fatalities compared to the regulatory attention received by less safe modes of general aviation and private automobiles. Additionally, we study two major fatal accident investigations from commercial aviation and two major automotive recalls associated with fatal accidents. We find differences in the cost per expected fatality prevented for these reactions, with the airline accident investigations being more cost effective. Overall, we observe trends in both the automotive and aviation sectors that suggest that public transportation receives more regulatory attention than private transport. We also observe that the types of safety remedies utilized, regulation versus investigation, have varying levels of effectiveness in different transport modes. We suggest that these differences are indicative of increased public demand for safety in modes where a third party may be held responsible, even for those not participating in the transportation. These findings have important implications for the transportation industry, policymakers, and for estimating the public demand for safety in new transport modes.
INTRODUCTION
Travel-related fatalities continue to be a leading cause of accidental death in the United States, (1) despite significant improvements in recent decades. (2) In attempting to improve safety performance, one important constraint of new safety measures is cost, for which the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) uses the guideline of the value of statistical life (VSL), most recently set at $9.1 million. (3) Such constraints avoid undue financial burden on individual travelers and commercial transportation while ensuring that funds are not overallocated to a single issue but spread across multiple risk sources.
In this article, we conduct a survey of the cost of U.S. federal government regulations for safety enhancement in various modes of transportation, including commercial air carriers, commuter and air taxi, general aviation, private automobiles, and buses. This survey is intended to reveal how resources have been allocated for different modes of transportation. We will seek to uncover whether public demand for safety varies across different modes of transportation and, if so, to determine why this might happen. We also investigate four major transportation safety cases from the past decade, two from commercial aviation and two from automobiles, to attempt to determine if their remedies are cost effective. In each of these cases, we consider a system design flaw related to a miscalculation, manufacturing or maintenance error, or unexpected operating condition that led to a risk of fatal accidents. We determine the break-even point of the investment by calculating the probability of a fatality prior to the safety improvement necessary to justify the cost of the improvement. Through this demonstration, we discuss the cost effectiveness of the current safety improvement cycle in the civil transportation sector.
Several significant prior works have examined the way the cost effectiveness of safety improvements has been analyzed. Viscusi and Aldy (4) provide a detailed overview of various factors affecting the applied VSL. Morrall (5) and Tengs et al. (6) both provide reviews of the cost effectiveness of previously implemented or proposed life-saving measures across many different fields. Cropper and Portney (7) outline some of the difficulties faced by regulators and policymakers in attempting to quantify cost effectiveness for new safety measures. Hammitt and Graham (8) outline the difficulty in assessing survey respondents' willingness to pay for safety, particularly in the case of highly unlikely events. Arrow et al. (9) provide a discussion of the ways in which cost-benefit analysis might be utilized to inform policy decisions.
Air travel has enjoyed many advances in safety technology since its inception. Safety enhancement in aviation is achieved not only by the evolution of technology, but also by incremental design improvements triggered by accidents. There were several epoch-making accidents that facilitated the evolution of the safety system, (10, 11) such as repeated accidents of the De Havilland Comet in the 1950s leading to the recognition of metal fatigue. Aviation accidents have high public profiles due to a potential for hundreds of fatalities in a single event. However, past research on the economics of aviation safety, (12) (13) (14) (15) mainly triggered by the public concerns over airline deregulation in 1978 in the United States, showed that market forces do not provide sufficient incentives for additional safety improvement. Thus, one important incentive for safety enhancement for air travel is safety measures mandated by laws and government regulations.
Private automobiles have also seen a great improvement in safety over recent decades. Safety features such as seat belts and air bags have become standard on all new vehicles, and campaigns for and in some cases laws requiring the use of seat belts have reduced the morbidity of accidents. (16) The advent of crash testing performed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA) starting in 1979 has allowed for objective measurement of safety and facilitated competition between auto manufacturers on their safety performance. (17) A major issue for improving highway safety has been related to driver behavior, such as speeding, impaired driving, distracted driving, or the use of safety devices such as seat belts. (17) There is substantial investment by local governments in enforcing laws that promote safe driver behavior. Enforcement of pilot training and responsible behavior is stricter in commercial air travel, where a small group of highly trained pilots receive much more oversight by the FAA, relative to the standards for private automobile drivers.
The outline of the article is as follows: first, we provide a review of relevant safety-related transportation data for the time period of 2002-2009. We then provide an overview of the cost of regulations issued for each transport mode as estimated by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. We next review four major safety interventions, two commercial aircraft accident investigations and two private automotive recalls, in order to determine their cost effectiveness. Finally, we discuss our findings from these studies and how they may impact future transportation innovations such as driverless vehicles.
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND REGULATION

Safety Statistics
In order to examine the emphasis of the U.S. government on transportation safety, we surveyed the accident-related statistics and economic impact of new safety regulations enacted between 2002 and 2009, the final year in which we have comprehensive safety review data for all of the considered transport modes.
To understand resource allocation for transportation safety, we must first quantify the level of safety in each transport mode. We utilize the conventional metric of fatalities per billion passenger miles fatalities for various modes of transportation for years 2002-2009 were obtained from the 2010 National Transportation Statistics report. We categorized the mode of aviation according to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). CFR Part 121 is the regulation governing scheduled commercial airliners (we call it "commercial air" in this article); CFR Part 135 governs on-demand air taxis and scheduled commuter carriers, such as business jets and regional airlines ("commuter and air taxi"); and CFR Part 91 governs general aviation, which includes private aircraft such as individual-owned aircraft or business jets.
Additionally, the report contains safety statistics for highway transport, from which we distinguish private automobiles (cars, sport utility vehicles [SUVs], light trucks, and motorcycles) and buses. Since the number of passengers involved in private transport is not explicitly known, we rely on survey estimations. The 2009 National Household Travel Survey (18) offers estimates of number of passengers and average distance traveled, from which we can determine passenger miles and total departures. Similarly, the annual FAA General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Survey (19) provides an estimation of the total number of departures for both general aviation and air taxi operations. However, there are no data regarding the average number of passengers on these trips, and therefore we assume ranges of load factors to compute passenger miles traveled for these modes. Table I shows the number of fatalities per billion passenger miles by mode of transport. We see that air carrier would be judged to be the safest mode, and roughly 250 times safer than private automobiles. General aviation, even with our highest estimates for passenger loads, is by far the least safe mode, while commuter and air taxi safety is comparable to private automobiles. Buses rank as the second safest mode, but still are nearly an order of magnitude less safe than air carriers.
Regulation Review
Next, we consider the economic impact of federal government regulations that were enacted over the same time period. The transport safety regulation system in the United States is complex. A review we have conducted on http://www.regulations.gov yielded over 3,500 relevant regulations published from 2000 to 2009 by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), NHTSA, and the DOT.
The reason for including safety regulations that predate the numbers for transport safety indicators we report above is to include any regulations whose effects might be delayed several years.
A summary review of the number and cost of regulations reviewed by agency is provided in Table II . While there are too many regulations to list each individually, the highest cost regulations issued by each agency are explained in more detail in the following section with more listed in the Appendix. If regulations are deemed to involve a significant cost, 4 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires a cost-benefit analysis, and we use this analysis to determine the cost of each regulation to the U.S. economy and transportation industry.
Notable Regulations Reviewed
While NHTSA is responsible for the most significant cost with a total of $73B, the FAA issued the highest number of regulations with 3,297, 2,140 of which were airworthiness directives (ADs). Only 330 of the 3,578 regulations reviewed were deemed to have a significant cost and therefore reviewed for cost effectiveness by the OMB. While regulations not deemed significant may have some nonzero cost, we feel this may be neglected due to the low cost of some significant regulations, as low as hundreds of dollars over 10 years. We additionally note that a small number of these regulations constitute a majority of the costs, so it is therefore worthwhile to consider some of these individually.
The single most expensive regulatory action of this time period is NHTSA's Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards that cost an estimated $47B; as this regulation has a minimal effect on transportation safety, we remove this regulation from our analysis and this cost is not included in Table II or subsequent analyses. Other significant regulations include: two regulations for $14B and $10B from NHTSA to improve rollover and roof crush risks, $12B from NHTSA for the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act (discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.3), $13B from the FMCSA to 
Regulatory Attention by Transport Mode
We aggregate the above safety regulations by mode based on the description provided in the regulation documentation, calculate the dollars spent on each mode over the entire period, and compare this to the number of observed fatalities, as shown in Table III . Note that some regulations may be counted multiple times in this table if they are estimated to affect multiple transport modes. It can be seen that air carriers and buses receive much more regulatory attention per fatality than other modes. The regulation cost per fatality of air carriers is about 200 times as large as that of private automobiles.
While some of the regulations considered may have direct economic value beyond improving safety, we consider that improving safety is the primary benefit of each regulation. Based on our review of the most cost-significant regulations as shown in the Appendix, we feel this is a reasonable assumption. We must recognize that a regulation would be deemed cost effective by the number of fatalities prevented, which we have no way of estimating. Instead, we consider the regulation cost per fatality observed, which gives us an idea of the total fatalities that could have been prevented, assuming that the number of fatalities would not have increased significantly absent the regulations. For comparison, we may consider the DOT-specified VSL, which is currently set at $9.1 million per fatality prevented.
Using this cost per observed fatality as a metric, we find that the cost of regulations for public modes of transportation, air carriers and buses, is much higher than their private counterparts, general aviation and private automobiles. As the rate of regulatory spending per fatality in these two modes is higher than the VSL, it may be argued that regulators are responding to a higher public demand for transportation safety in these modes. Commuter and air taxis receive moderate regulatory attention as compared to commercial aviation and general aviation, while general aviation and private automobiles, the two least safe modes, received the least regulatory spending per fatality by the U.S. federal government.
COST-EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF SPECIFIC FATAL ACCIDENT RESPONSES
The cost of regulations cited in the previous section is based on government estimates justifying the regulations. It is instructive to also look at the actual costs incurred to correct some well-publicized safety defects. Such an examination reveals that there are Note: The number in parentheses is the total cost in billions during the period.
additional costs, including the cost of investigations to determine what safety defect caused fatalities, and the cost to recall vehicles. In this section, we propose a method of calculating the cost effectiveness of these investigations and demonstrate its application on example case studies from transportation and aviation. These few cases are not intended as representative of the current state of transportation policy and are simply provided as examples of how the proposed cost-effectiveness calculation might be applied.
Cost-Effectiveness Measures of Safety Investigations and the Resulting Remedies
Accident investigations have been playing a central role in improving aviation safety. Elaborate investigations identify the probable causes of accidents and lead to safety recommendations to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. Independence of investigators from other authorities and separation from blame guarantees the quality of investigations. (20, 21) More recently, it has been proposed that the approaches and methods of aviation accident investigation be extended to a wider context of social concerns, such as natural disaster or economic fraud. (22, 23) Aviation is also a mode of civil transportation for which accident investigation is mandated in the United States, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is responsible for it.
Similarly, the NTSB carries out accident investigations for private automobiles, though due to the sheer number of accidents, not all will receive NTSB attention. When a safety issue is found requiring attention, typically after one or more accidents take place, the DOT may mandate a recall of a certain vehicle or family of vehicles. As with aviation accidents, a series of accident and safety investigations may be undertaken; however, unlike some aviation cases, this is a relatively negligible cost for automobile recalls. It then falls to the responsibility of the manufacturer to provide an appropriate safety remedy for the affected vehicles and to cover the costs of this repair. Though automotive recalls and aircraft accident investigations are not identical, we view the results of both actions in terms of reacting to a safety issue with new measures as similar enough for comparison.
For a cost-effectiveness study, we deploy a simple break-even calculation of the investment in an accident investigation or recall and focus on fatal accidents. The expense, C inv , is the cost of the investigation and the following safety remedies, if needed. The payoff is the expected monetary value of lives to be saved, V saved , in the future as a result of the investigation and remedies. Potential future fatalities related to an accident are calculated by the product of the expected number of fatalities N f that would result from a similar accident, the number of airplanes or automobiles N a that have the same failure potential, and the probability of reoccurrence of the accident in the remaining lifetime. For estimating N a , one may take into account not only existing vehicles but also not-yet-built ones that will potentially benefit in the future from the improved design and safety regulations. Accident investigation has the potential to change the probability of accident reoccurrence, through implementation of the recommended safety measures. On this basis, the expected monetary value of lives to be saved (V saved ) can be calculated as
where V 1life is the value of a single life, P before is the probability of a fatal accident occurring per remaining lifetime of one vehicle before safety improvement is applied, and P after is the probability of an accident after the improvement is applied. The break-even point happens when the invested cost in the investigation and remedies, C inv , is equal to V saved . The dollar value of a fatality, V 1life , is defined as the amount we are willing to give up in exchange for a small decrease in the probability of one less fatality, called the value of a statistical life. (24) This is a common approach in economics, used to evaluate effectiveness of policies in medicine, the environment, and other areas. How much a society should invest in preventing fatalities is controversial, as seen in many ongoing discussions in different communities, e.g., healthcare, transportation, the environment, etc. Viscusi (25) analyzed data on worker deaths across different industries, and suggested that the value of a life lies in the range of $4.7-$8.7 million. In aviation, economic values used in investment and regulatory decisions of the DOT were analyzed and determined. The guidance led to the value of $6.2 million per fatality adopted in 2011 (26) and most recently updated it to $9.1 million in 2013. (3) Similarly, in Europe, an aviation fatality avoided is valued at €4.05 million by the European Transport Safety Council in 2003. (27) For a given investigation and remedy cost C inv , it is possible to calculate how much we spend to prevent the loss of one life in the future as:
This measure would be compared to the DOT guideline to determine whether accident investigation is cost effective or not. On the other hand, the value of lives to be saved can be used as the costeffective threshold of the invested cost C inv,th or the accident probability P before,th , assuming that P after is zero as in Equations (3) and (4), respectively,
Note that these equations are not intended to provide a precise estimate of cost effectiveness of investigations as many of the terms in these equations are not known and can never be measured. However, we may be able to estimate these terms in order to produce a Fermi estimate of the probability of an accident before an intervention as well as the break-even probability that would justify the cost of the reaction. When these numbers are comparable, we are unable to say whether an intervention was truly effective; instead, we use this analysis as a way to discuss differences in cost effectiveness between various reactions to accidents.
Case Studies for Investigations into Fatal Accidents
We select four cases of responses to fatal accidents from roughly the same time period as our study of transportation regulations. These four cases should not be regarded as a complete list of all actions taken to respond to transportation safety risks during this time period. They are selected as, in the opinion of the authors, they represent the most noteworthy safety investigations during this period for commercial airlines and private automobiles, respectively. Because of their high profile, we are also able to obtain much of the data needed for our analysis. By studying specific cases of reactions to safety issues, we hope to better understand the situations in which a proposed remedy is likely to be cost effective. This is not intended to represent the broad state of transportation safety or policy; these case studies simply are used to demonstrate the application of the cost-effectiveness calculation introduced in the previous section. Recognizing that the analysis performed is speculative due to limited available information, we take conservative assumptions regarding costs and probabilities of accidents recurring in order to consider any potential cases as much possible.
American Airlines Flight 587
The first example is the fatal accident of American Airlines Flight 587, which occurred on November 12, 2001. The airplane, an Airbus A300-605R, crashed into a neighborhood in Belle Harbor, New York, after taking off from the John F. Kennedy International Airport. All 260 people aboard and five people on the ground were killed. (28, 29) NTSB determined that the probable cause was "the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate strength that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs (when the pilot reacted to wake turbulence)." The NTSB report concluded that "[t]he American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence." The report also discussed a widespread misunderstanding among pilots about performance of the rudder limiter system; pilots believed that a limiter would prevent structural damage no matter how they moved the control. However, the limiter did not take into account structural damage caused by repetitive opposite direction rudder inputs that resulted in the excessive load.
FAA issued an AD in 2011 (30) requiring a modification to the rudder control system, called the pedal travel limiter unit (PTLU). The AD estimates the implementation cost of PTLU for 215 airplanes in the fleet at $42,677,500. For the cost-effectiveness study, the number of potential fatalities was estimated at 213, based on the typical passenger capacity of the model (266 passengers) and a load factor of about 80%, and nine crewmembers. Adding the costs of accident investigation and other safety remedies (e.g., pilot training), which are not publicly available, the total invested cost is roughly estimated as $52 million U.S. 2013 dollars.
Using above data, we calculate the costeffectiveness threshold of the accident probability P before,th defined in Equation (4) . Based on $9.1 million for V 1life , P before,th is estimated at 1.2×10 −4 in the remaining lifetime of a single airplane. This probability corresponds to 6.0 × 10
per flight, assuming that the remaining life time is roughly half the design service goal of 40,000 flight cycles for the airplane. (31) This rough estimate is based on the analysis of the available operating data of A300 class aircraft in the TranStats database. (32) It is remarkable that this probability is substantially smaller than the actual total rate of fatal accidents per departure from 2002 to 2009, 1.8 × 10 −7 . Therefore, it can be said that this accident investigation is cost effective unless the probability of the accident is extremely small.
Alaska Airlines Flight 261
The next example is the crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261, which occurred on January 31, 2000. Fatalities included two pilots, three cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers. The airplane, MD-83, was destroyed by impact forces. (33) The NTSB concluded that the probable cause was "a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly's acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines' insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly."
According to the NTSB report, several factors contributed to the accident. First, lubrication of the nut threads was not adequately performed. Second, there were inappropriately wide lubrication and inspection intervals for the wear condition; because of this, wear exceeding its critical condition could not be discovered before the following lubrication or inspection point. The FAA issued ADs (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) requiring repetitive inspections and lubrication. These improvements were applicable not only to MD series but also to Boeing airplanes. Table IV shows the fleet sizes of airplane models to which the ADs were applied, and the passenger sizes of those airplanes obtained from the company's website. We roughly assume that five inspections and lubrications would be needed in the rest of the lifecycle of each airplane, and the overhaul of nut and screw, which was applied only to Boeing-737, is a one-time item. Based on the work hours and labor rates provided by the ADs, as well as the estimated cost of inspection, we calculate the total cost for the safety improvements as roughly $18.5 million U.S. 2013 dollars.
In the same manner as the previous example, we calculate the cost-effective threshold of the accident probability as 2.5 × 10 −6 per lifetime of a single airplane. Here, we used $9.1 million for V 1life , and the number of potential fatalities to be saved is calculated by summing up N f N a of each airplane model shown in Table IV with a load factor of 80%. This probability can be converted into 1.2 × 10 −10 per flight, which is also much lower than the actual fatal accident rate (1.8 × 10 −7 ). As with the previous example, we assume, based on the analysis of the TranStats database for Boeing aircraft, that the remaining life of the airplane is 20,000, half the design service goal of a typical airplane.
Despite being the two most fatal aviation accidents in the United States over the time period we cover in this study, their total safety regulation cost (about $67 million) only represents about 1% of the total regulation cost of $7.5B as described in Table II .
Ford/Firestone Tread Separation and Rollover
Recall, 2000
The first automotive recall considered is the Ford/Firestone tire recall in 2000. NHTSA found that Firestone Wilderness AT and ATX tires produced at the Firestone plant in Decatur, IL, were subject to tread separation during operation in certain conditions, particularly low pressure, high speed, and hot weather operations, which could lead to increased risk of vehicle rollover when the tires fail. In particular, these tires were installed on Ford SUVs, where it was thought that this issue would lead to a higher risk of rollover. (40) Firestone issued a recall of a total of 6.5 million tires, affecting roughly 1.3 million vehicles. (41) Though estimates vary, somewhere between 150 and 300 fatalities are thought to have been caused by this tread separation issue. (42) The total direct cost of this recall, shared between Firestone and Ford, is estimated at between approximately $1.3 and 1.7B in 2013 dollars; (43) the cost of investigation is assumed to be negligible as NHTSA's entire annual highway safety program budget is roughly $120M.
Using $9.1M as the VSL, and considering an average passenger load for private automobiles as 1.5 based on the 2009 National Household Travel Survey, (18) we calculate a threshold probability of a fatal accident per vehicle between 7.4 × 10 −5 and 9.7 × 10 −5 . In the case of automobile accidents, we can also estimate the actual probability of failure before the recall since we have over 1 million vehicles and hundreds of accidents. Based on the 1.3M vehicles affected and NHTSA's most likely estimate of treadseparation-related fatalities of 197, (41) we find the probability of a fatal accident as 1.5 × 10 −4 , with 5% and 95% confidence bounds of 1.3 × 10 −4 and 1.7 × 10 −4 . We may additionally correct this probability to account for the fact that the 6.5M tires recalled were not all at end of life, and some may have failed later had they not been recalled. However, since this would depend on individual operating conditions, driving habits, tire age, and probability of tire failure over tire life, it is difficult to make any meaningful assessment, though we conservatively estimate a range from a factor of 1.5-3 increase in fatal accident probability based on the average age of vehicles included in the recall, meaning the average wear on recalled tires between one-third and two-thirds of the expected tire life of roughly five years or 60,000 miles.
We find that the estimated range of probability of a fatal accident is only slightly higher than the range of threshold probability of failure based on the data collected. This indicates that the safety increase due to the recall likely at least broke even with the costs, and could be as much as a factor of 3 more. However, we note that this is a much narrower margin that seen with the previous two cases of accident investigations in air travel.
It should be noted that this investigation led to one of the most cost-significant regulations for private automobiles during the time of our survey. This is the TREAD Act, which cost a total of $24B, 38% of all private automotive regulation costs during our survey period from 2002 to 2009. However, this regulation deals exclusively with the way manufacturers report recalls and safety concerns to NHTSA, and does not specifically address the issue of tread separation or rollover, and therefore this cost is not included in our calculations for this investigation.
Toyota Unintended Acceleration Recalls, 2009/2010
The second auto case considered is actually two related recalls that occurred at roughly the same time that dealt with the unintended acceleration accidents involving Toyota vehicles in 2009 and 2010. The first recall replaced floor mats in some Toyota vehicles that were believed to potentially cause the accelerator pedal to stick. The second dealt with wear in the accelerator pedal that could cause sticking unrelated to the floor mats. These recalls affected 2.23M and 4.44M vehicles, respectively. Due to overlap in the recalls, a total of nearly 5M vehicles were recalled. Toyota vehicles with fatal accidents attributed to unintended acceleration account for as many as 48 deaths, (44) though DOT investigations concluded that many such accidents may actually be related to driver error.
(45) The direct cost of the recalls, as reported by Toyota, was $1.12B (46) and the cost of the investigation is again assumed to be negligible in comparison.
Again, using the VSL of $9.1M and an average passenger load of 1.5, we find that the threshold probability of a fatal accident per vehicle for cost effectiveness is 1.65 × 10 −5 . We again estimate the actual probability of failure based on the number of fatal accidents observed, and find a nominal value of 4.96 × 10 −6 with confidence bounds of 3.00 × 10 −6 and 6.91 × 10 −6 . As with our previous auto recall example, we recognize that these estimates are based on some vehicles that are not at end of life. However, in this case, we consider that it may be reasonable to assume that the probability of this specific accident is constant over the lifetime of the vehicle, and we may try to estimate the average age of vehicles in the recall. Based on available data, we consider that the average vehicle recalled was five years old, with a useful life of 15 years. Since we assume that the probability of an accident is constant over time, we may simply correct our calculated probability of failure by a factor of 3, such that we find the estimated probability before the recall as 1.49 × 10 with confidence bounds of 9.00 × 10 −6 -2.07 × 10 −5 . Even with this correction, we see that it is very likely that the probability of a fatal accident prior to the recall was below the cost-effectiveness threshold.
Since this recall happened outside the date range of our regulation study, we have no direct information about any regulations resulting from this recall and investigation. However, the authors are unaware of any current or proposed regulations related to these Toyota recalls.
DISCUSSION OF COST EFFECTIVENESS
Based on the studies presented in Sections 2 and 3, we may draw some conclusions about the cost effectiveness of safety measures for various modes and the allocation of resources within the U.S. transportation sector. We may also attempt to understand some broader implications for safety measures based on differences between different transport modes. However, we recognize that this discussion does not represent a complete list of factors influencing allocation of resources for transportation safety and that our review of accident investigations is limited to a small sample size due to lack of available information. The discussion in this section is not intended to propose optimal policy, but simply to summarize potential effects evident in what data we do have.
First, we find that commercial aviation receives much more regulatory attention per fatality than general aviation. At the levels of regulatory spending seen during the years considered (2002-2009), commercial aviation received regulatory spending per fatality at a rate of roughly three times the DOT VSL. At the same time, general aviation received the second lowest regulatory attention per fatality despite being the least safe mode in our study based on fatalities per passenger mile. General aviation additionally received the lowest regulatory emphasis in terms of absolute dollars spent over the time period considered at $2.82 billion as compared to $6.43 billion for commercial aviation. A recent study of general aviation safety by Thomas Frank at USA Today (47) found that 86% of general aviation accidents are attributed to pilot error, including cases where subsequent investigations reveal defective parts contributed to an accident. These findings suggest that public demand for safety is lower when an individual is perceived to be responsible for his or her own safety, even though this may not always truly be the case.
We consider several reasons why this disparity between modes might exist. First, while fatal commercial airline accidents may be catastrophic events involving hundreds of fatalities, general aviation accidents typically affect few people and occur more frequently and with less national coverage. Additionally, a different level of individual responsibility exists in general aviation accidents, where those involved are at least perceived to have some control over ensuring their own safety. This personal responsibility does not exist in commercial air travel, where travelers must place their trust in the pilot to ensure their safety. These factors together may lead to a higher perceived risk from commercial air travel by the general public, which is then reflected in their demand for new regulations. Even if risks are well understood, individuals may feel that a higher level of safety is appropriate in modes where a third party is providing transportation. This concept of risk perception is one that is already well studied in existing literature. As the details of risk perception lie outside the authors' expertise, we elect not to discuss them here and instead refer readers to important works such as Slovic, (48) Rowe and Wright, (49) and Sjöberg. (50) This idea is reinforced by the allocation of new regulations in private automobiles and bus travel, where buses receive much more regulatory attention, possibly due to the fact that, as with the aviation case, bus accidents involve a larger number of people who are dependent on a single driver to ensure safety. Finally, in the case of private automobiles, much of the regulation and enforcement of responsible driver behavior is executed by state and local government. In that realm, we see new regulations such as requiring seat-belt use and prohibitions on using cell phones. However, the increased regulatory cost of such measures is not expected to be able to offset greatly the factor of 450 between regulatory spending per fatality between buses and private automobiles.
These findings may have implications for future developments in transportation such as partially or fully automated transport systems. Many automobile companies and research groups have made substantial efforts to develop autonomous or self-driving cars. As of 2015, four states (California, Nevada, Florida, and Michigan, as well as the District of Columbia) have legalized the use of autonomous vehicles on public roads. A 2014 University of Michigan study of public perception of autonomous cars (51) found that 88% of survey respondents expressed concern about the prospect of riding in a fully autonomous vehicle, while over 60% also responded that the use of fully autonomous vehicles would be expected to reduce both the number and severity of accidents. These results reflect our suggestion that entrusting one's safety to an external actor increases an individual's demand for safety. Designers of autonomous systems as well as policymakers should therefore consider the public's increased demand for safety in these new modes as they develop.
We also proposed a method for approximating the cost effectiveness of reactive safety measures like accident investigations and recalls, and reviewed two of the largest airline accident investigations and two of the largest automobile recalls from roughly the same time period as our regulation study. While both airline accident investigations were found to be easily cost effective by at least an order of magnitude based on the expected number of fatalities prevented, the automotive recalls were not so clear, with one being slightly cost effective and one likely below the costeffectiveness threshold. This implies that these more reactive safety measures may be more likely to be cost effective for aviation compared to automobiles, though further investigation into a more comprehensive list of investigations is needed.
We propose that this observed difference might be due to two factors: the population size of the vehicles affected and the relative reliability of both systems. Though safety investigations for private automobiles are relatively inexpensive, the cost of performing a recall is often quite high even when the cost of a remedy is low due to the potentially millions of vehicles involved. Conversely, commercial aviation accident investigations may be much more costly, but the resulting safety recommendations are only implemented on several hundred aircraft or less. Compounding this issue is the relative value at risk in terms of the number of people affected per accident, which is much greater for air travel than for automobiles. This means that fixing any one issue for an airline will result in a proportionally larger increase in safety than for automobiles where a safety increase may be only marginal.
This reveals potentially important considerations for designers as well as regulators, as the types of safety issues faced in all transport modes typically have very low probabilities of occurrence, on the order of 1 in 1 million or less. This means that uncovering and preventing safety issues during the design process requires extensive testing and simulation, which is costly, and these costs are ultimately passed on to consumers. These costs are only exacerbated when the method of failure is unknown or difficult to predict, such as those related to operator error. We see that for airliners, safety concerns are easier to detect due to the rarity of accidents and in-depth investigation into each accident, while with private automobiles, individual issues may be more difficult to find and are clearly more expensive to remedy due to the cost of recalls.
Furthermore, the financial incentives in commercial aviation and private automobiles are quite different. Airlines and aircraft designers may seek to improve safety beyond what is required in order to appear safe to their customers. The relative low cost of addressing safety concerns in commercial aviation does not provide adequate financial incentive for designers to attempt to avoid them, and public opinion after accidents generally affects airlines, with little impact on designers. (12) (13) (14) (15) Conversely, we have shown that automobile recalls pose a financial burden applied directly to automobile designers. Automobile designers face additional losses related to public perception of their brand as they compete on safety records. (52) This may suggest that the automobile market is more efficient at creating improved safety, while commercial aviation safety requires more regulatory involvement. This might help to justify the differences in regulatory attention between modes. Understanding these differences between each mode may assist in an effective balance between preventative design and testing versus oversight and improvements to existing products.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that airlines and buses receive much more regulatory emphasis as measured by cost of regulation per observed fatality as compared to general aviation and private automobiles, respectively. This happens in spite of much better safety records of airlines and buses.
This could be due, in part, to nonregulatory safety actions in modes like private automobiles such as traffic enforcement and seat-belt requirements. It could also reflect the already high cost of recalls due to existing regulations as seen in our review of recalls. We also conducted an initial study of two major commercial aviation accident investigations and two major automobile safety recalls and demonstrated a cost-effectiveness calculation approach for each, finding that the two aircraft accident investigations strongly appeared to be cost effective, while the effectiveness of the two automobile recalls was less clear. Based on analysis of our regulation studies, we suggest that public demand for increased safety appears to be affected in part by the level of personal responsibility for ensuring safety. Additionally, the effectiveness of various types of safety measures (regulation or investigation/recall) is shown to be affected by the relative number of affected vehicles, the number of lives at risk, and the relative safety level of the mode. Designers and policymakers should be aware of these effects as they work on improving existing transportation as well as the development of novel modes, and methods for cost-benefit analysis such as the one presented in this work can be utilized to estimate the cost effectiveness of proposed reactive measures. New forms of transportation such as self-driving cars may not only need to be safer than traditional cars, but may have even more stringent safety requirements.
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